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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Appellant/Petitioner Vance Thumm (referred hereinafter as Vance,  Mr. Thumm, 
or Appellant) appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction 
relief.  He raises many errors with the first two being the most significant and the rest 
having a more cumulative effect.   
First, trial counsel failed to object to (or move to sever) a classic Bruton1 
confrontation clause violation when a non-testifying co-defendant’s statements, which 
were inadmissible against Vance, were nevertheless admitted without limitation at their 
joint trial.  
In response, the post-conviction court held that the statements were actually 
admissible as excited utterances even though the two witnesses that related those 
statements both testified the declarant co-defendant was not excited.  The post-conviction 
court further held that one statement made by the non-testifying co-defendant was also 
admissible as a statement against interest of the witness testifying about it because it 
inculpated him.  
These are obviously wrong rulings, and the court’s ultimate conclusion based on 
them, that the cases could be joined because the evidence would have been admissible in 
Vance’s separate trial, was erroneous as well.   
                                            
1 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1970).   
2 
 
The second issue involved a Brady2 claim.  A fingerprint report was tardily 
disclosed prior to trial.  The trial court ruled it was too late for the defense to have an 
expert look at it and excluded it from evidence. After trial the exculpatory nature of the 
report was discovered by the defendant.   
The post-conviction court held, inter alia, that Brady requires suppression of 
evidence and, since the report was disclosed prior to trial (albeit late), that there is no 
evidence the state suppressed such evidence.  Appellant asserts that while the test is 
somewhat different, delayed disclosure can also be a Brady violation and suggests the test 
used by the First Circuit is instructive and should be adopted.  
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The facts as they appear in Appellant's opening brief in the direct appeal 
(Supreme Court No. 37512) of this case set forth in a succinct manner relevant evidence 
presented at the jury trial in this matter with precise citations to the trial transcript.3   
Where they are necessary, additional facts will be provided below at the appropriate time.  
 On the night of April 10, 2009, Jeremy Steinmetz bought three Olde English 
“forties” and a bottle of Tequila and took them over to Paris Davis’ house for an informal 
party with friends before going out to the bars for the night.  (Tr., p. 696, Ls. 2-13, p. 697, 
                                            
2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,  83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). 
 
3 The district court took judicial notice of the trial transcripts, so Appellant is 
contemporaneously herewith moving this Court to take judicial notice of the trial 
transcripts contained in Supreme Court  No. 37512. (R. p. 350.)  
 
A citation to “R” will always refer to the instant Clerk’s Record and a citation to “Tr.”  
will always refer to the trial transcript.   
3 
 
Ls. 1-3.)  When Steinmetz arrived with Helen Fisher, Ms. Davis and Kaylan Speers were 
already at the house.  (Tr., p. 693, Ls. 18-25.)  Soon thereafter, Vance Thumm, 
Ms. Davis’ boyfriend, arrived purportedly wearing a light blue shirt with a design on the 
front.   (Tr., p. 697, L. 12 – p. 698, L. 5.)  Prior to going to The Office, a Boise bar,  
Steinmetz had a shot of Tequila with Mr. Thumm.4  (Tr., p. 804, Ls. 11-14.)  At about 
10:30 p.m., everyone loaded into Steinmetz’s 1994 Cadillac STS and headed to The 
Office.  (Tr., p. 698, Ls. 13-25.)  While at the bar, Steinmetz consumed approximately 
three AMF’s: a blue alcoholic beverage between six and eight inches tall.5  (Tr., p. 461, 
L. 7 – p. 462, L. 21.)  At about 1:30 a.m., Steinmetz, Ms. Davis, and Ms. Fisher left The 
Office and went back to Paris’ place.  (Tr., p. 700, L. 6 – p. 702, L. 17.)   
Upon arriving at Paris’ residence, Steinmetz discovered that the alcohol he had 
purchased and left there was missing.  (Tr., p. 716, Ls. 9-17.)  Steinmetz then learned that 
Mr. Thumm had rented a motel room at the Budget Inn and now had to drive the girls 
over to the motel so that Ms. Davis could be with her boyfriend.6  (Tr., p. 705, L. 2 – p. 
708, L. 19.)  Once at the motel, Steinmetz discovered his bottle of Tequila and Olde 
English forties and indicated he suspected Mr. Thumm had taken his alcohol and was 
“mad” about it.  (Tr., p. 716, Ls. 3-17, p. 787, L. 8 – p. 788, L. 10.)   
                                            
4 On direct examination, Steinmetz had testified that only Ms. Fisher was drinking before 
going to The Office and then admitted on cross examination that he committed perjury by 
stating he had not consumed alcohol prior to going to the bar.  (See Tr., p. 698, Ls. 6-8, p. 
804, Ls. 8-24.)   
5 AMF stands for “Adios Motherfucker” and is described as a very strong alcoholic drink 
consisting of a number of different liquors. (Tr., p. 461, Ls. 7-11, p. 803, Ls. 3-23.)  
6 Steinmetz and Ms. Davis had a prior short sexual relationship that ended when Paris 
broke up with him.  (Tr., p. 788, L. 18 – p. 789, L. 17.) 
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At around 3:00 or 3:30 a.m., Deven Ohls arrived at the Budget Inn with Ms. 
Speers and his girlfriend, Brooke Everhart.  (Tr., p. 493, L. 19 – p. 495, L. 1.)  Mr. Ohls 
testified that there were at least 15 people inside the hotel room.  (Tr., p. 497, Ls. 5-8.)  
After being at the party for a short time, Mr. Ohls was sucker punched from the side.  
(Tr., p. 501, Ls. 1-10.)  Mr. Ohls described the person that punched him as a Hispanic 
male, about his height, with longer hair, and no noticeable tattoos.  (Tr., p. 503, L. 12 – p. 
504, L. 25.)  After the first punch, Mr. Ohls indicated that he was attacked by maybe four 
or five guys.  (Tr., p. 506, Ls. 1-17.)  At one point during the altercation, one of the 
attackers pulled out a knife and stabbed Mr. Ohls in the buttocks.  (Tr., p. 507, L. 19 – p. 
509, L. 11.)  Mr. Ohls testified that he did not recall seeing Mr. Thumm at the motel that 
night, but he did see who was punching him, and wanted to testify because he was “100 
percent” sure Mr. Thumm did not participate in the attack.  (Tr., p. 515, L. 10 – p. 516, L. 
10, p. 529, L. 3 – p. 531, L. 7, p. 534, Ls. 5-10.)  In fact, Mr. Ohls testified that in May he 
asked the prosecutors to come and talk to him, and he told the investigator and deputy 
prosecutor that Mr. Thumm was not involved in the attack.  (Tr., p. 532, L. 17 – p. 533, 
L. 1.)  When Officer Jesiah Ransom arrived on the scene and asked Mr. Ohls what 
happened, Mr. Ohls told him that he was jumped by a “black motherfucking nigger.”  
(Tr., p. 372, L. 10 – p. 373, L. 3.) 
Approximately a week after the incident, Christopher Smith admitted to stabbing 
Mr. Ohls and participating in the attack.  (Tr., p. 956, L. 13 – p. 957, L. 4, p. 990, L. 1 – 
p. 991, L. 15.)  In fact, Mr. Smith voluntarily turned himself in following the altercation, 
admitted punching and stabbing Mr. Ohls, and told officers that he felt Mr. Thumm was 
being unfairly implicated in the offense because he paid for the motel room.  (Tr., p. 989, 
5 
 
L. 23 – p. 990, L. 6.)  Mr. Smith was arrested and charged with aggravated battery.  
(Tr., p. 957, Ls. 3-16.)  Mr. Thumm was also arrested and charged with aggravated 
battery, and a third person, Frankie Hughes, was also later arrested and charged with two 
counts of aggravated battery.7  (Tr., p. 959, L. 23 – p. 964, L. 11.)  Hughes was actually 
the last person arrested for the attack on Mr. Ohls as he fled to Utah after the fight.  (Tr., 
p. 907, L. 11 – p. 908, L. 6.)  From the beginning of the investigation, Hughes was 
uncooperative and untruthful with police.  (Tr., p. 987, L. 20 – p. 988, L. 12.)  However, 
following his preliminary hearing wherein he was bound over for one count of felony 
aggravated battery on Mr. Ohls, and Officer Brian Holland convinced him he would have 
a “good chance” at probation if he helped officers out, Hughes agreed to provide police 
with his version of the events occurring on April 11th.  (Tr., p. 908, L. 17 – p. 909, L. 9, p. 
987, L. 16 – p. 988, L. 17.)   
Hughes testified that on the morning of April 11th, Mr. Thumm invited him over 
to a party at the Budget Inn.  (Tr., p. 850, L. 17 – p. 851, L. 13.)  When he got there, he 
observed Mr. Thumm, Mr. Smith, and Ariel Carpenter all in the room, with Mr. Thumm 
wearing a “white tannish shirt.”  (Tr., p. 851, L. 18 – p. 852, L. 9, p. 853, Ls. 22-25.)  
According to Hughes, he overheard Mr. Thumm tell Ms. Davis over the phone, “[d]on’t 
bring any fuckin’ lames over because I don’t feel like beating anyone up tonight.”  
(Tr., p. 857, Ls. 3-11.)  Later, when Mr. Ohls arrived at the party, Hughes told the jury 
that Mr. Thumm purportedly asked him “Who the fuck is this[?]”  (Tr., p. 860, Ls. 10-
16.)  Hughes testified that Mr. Thumm and Mr. Ohls were relaxed, talking at first, then 
                                            
7 One of the aggravated battery charges was related to Hughes breaking a beer bottle over 




Mr. Thumm took a drink of the Tequila and “then I look over and I look back up, and 
Deven Ohls is sitting in the corner of that wall.  And that’s when I seen [sic] Vance was 
punching him in the face.”  (Tr., p. 864, L. 1 – p. 867, L. 25.)  Hughes continued to 
describe his purported observations of the fight, identifying only Mr. Thumm and 
Mr. Smith as the combatants of Mr. Ohls.  (See Tr., p. 868, L. 1 – p. 886, L. 4.)  
According to Hughes he was just an innocent observer to the battery on Mr. Ohls and 
even told the jury he tried to stop the fight on two occasions.  (See Tr., p. 868, L. 1 – p. 
888, L. 13.) 
The only other person that testified that he saw part of the altercation at the 
Budget Inn was Steinmetz.  Steinmetz said that soon after he arrived at the motel and 
discovered his missing alcohol, he felt Mr. Thumm’s body bump against him.  (Tr., p. 
715, L. 22 – p. 716, L. 21, p. 723, Ls. 12-17.)  Steinmetz told the jury that Mr. Ohls was 
“[s]tanding in a fetal position, holding, covering his head, while Mr. Thumm was 
throwing upper cuts and the Hispanic male was stomping at Mr. Ohls head.”  (Tr., p. 723, 
L. 18 – p. 724, L. 16.)  Steinmetz ran out of the room to his car to find Ms. Davis by the 
passenger side door “clearly freaking out.”  (Tr., p. 726, L. 14 – p. 727, L. 22.)  Steinmetz 
then ran over to Mr. Ohls’ car to find Ms. Everhart, Ms. Speers, and Ms. Fisher sitting 
inside.  (Tr., p. 731, Ls. 1-18.)  Steinmetz testified that he went back into the motel room 
to get Ms. Speers’ purse and identified two individuals holding Mr. Ohls on the bed and 
“one was in front of him holding a bottle.”  (Tr., p. 731, L. 19 – p. 732, L. 19.)  Steinmetz 
told the jury that he saw the person, whom he could not identify, swing the bottle toward 
Mr. Ohls’ face.  (Tr., p. 732, L. 23 – p. 733, L. 5.)  Steinmetz grabbed the purse, left the 
room, gave it to Ms. Speers, and went to his car.  (Tr., p. 733, L. 9 – p. 735, L. 25.)  
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Steinmetz testified that he was in the motel room during the fight for only up to 30 
seconds.  (Tr., p. 772, Ls. 16-25, p. 774, Ls. 6-10.)  Eventually Hughes, the Hispanic 
male, and Mr. Thumm got into Steinmetz’s car, and he drove them to Ms. Davis’ 
residence.  (Tr., p. 736, L. 1 – p. 737, L. 22.)  While in the car, Steinmetz alleged that he 
heard Ms. Davis tell the occupants to get rid of their clothing that had blood stains on it.8  
(Tr., p. 739, L. 18 – p. 740, L. 17.)   
Steinmetz dropped everyone in his car off at Paris’ residence and returned to the 
Budget Inn.  (Tr., p. 756, L. 19, p. 757, L. 12.)  He was stopped and questioned by police, 
but failed to provide officers with any of the significant information he disclosed during 
his testimony in trial.  (Tr., p. 759, L. 4 – p. 761, L. 22.)  Steinmetz attempted to excuse 
his inconsistent statements and uncooperative behavior because he was afraid of being 
charged with aiding and abetting9 and answered “yes” to the prosecutor’s leading 
question that the reason he failed to identify Mr. Thumm in the first photo lineup “was 
because of fear.”  (Tr., p. 763, L. 12 – p. 765, L. 10, p. 784, Ls. 18-24.)  A few days later, 
Steinmetz told the jury that Mr. Thumm purportedly told him to “just don’t say nothing.”  
(Tr., p. 762, L. 20 – p. 763, L. 4.) 
Mr. Thumm was charged with Aggravated Battery and Persistent Violator and his 
case with joined with that of Paris Davis, who was charged with the felony offenses of 
solicitation of destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence and accessory to 
aggravated battery.   
                                            
8 According to Steinmetz, Ms. Davis also said “Vance, you’re going to prison.”  (Tr., p. 
755, Ls. 18-21.) 
9 Steinmetz has never been charged with anything associated with this case.  (Tr., p. 784, 
L. 25 – p. 785, L. 2.) 
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Mr. Thumm was originally represented by Ada County Public Defender Nicolas 
"Nick" Wollen. (R. p. 351.)   Due to his dissatisfaction with his public defender, he hired 
retained counsel, Virginia Bond, approximately two months before trial. (R. p. 351.) She 
characterized the public defender as having done absolutely nothing.  
There was really not a thing done by the public defenders. No discussion 
about response to request for discovery, no witness list. Absolutely 
nothing.  
 
Tr. p. 21, lns. 2-5.  
Mr. Thumm and Paris Davis were tried together to a jury and both were found 
guilty as charged.  Virginia Bond withdrew as counsel prior to sentencing due to a 
conflict of interest that made it impossible to communicate and a different public 
defender was appointed. (R. p. 146, 351.) Mr. Thumm was sentenced to 40 years in 
prison with the first 40 years fixed. (R. p. 351)   The Court of Appeals affirmed his 
conviction and judgment in a published opinion.  State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 285 
P.3d 348 (Ct.App. 2012.)   
Mr. Thumm timely brought a verified petition for post-conviction relief with 
exhibits. (R. p. 7-65.)  The state filed an answer to the petition and a motion for summary 
disposition and brief in support. (R. p. 102-103; 104-128; 129-130.)  The state filed an 
objection to Petitioner’s exhibits, which the court overruled. (R. p. 350.)  
With leave of court, Petitioner filed an amended verified petition that was 
identical to the original petition up until the end where new claims, paragraphs, and 
exhibits were added. (R. p. 138-211.) The state filed a supplemental brief in support of 
motion for summary disposition of additional claims to address the additional claims. (R. 
p. 214-218.)  Appellant filed Petitioner’s response to Respondent’s motion for summary 
9 
 
disposition with exhibits. (R. p. 223-343.) The state filed a notification of citations and 
authority. (R. p. 344-346.)  
A hearing on the motion for summary disposition was held and the court took he 
matter under advisement . (R. p. 347.) 
The court issued a written order granting state’s motion for summary disposition 
and dismissing petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. (R. p. 350-393.)   The court 
did note that it had taken judicial notice in response to the various parties requests 
including the information in the criminal case,  the jury instructions, and the trial 
transcripts. (R. p. 350.) 
A separate judgment was entered. (R. p. 348-349.) 





WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION 






THE COURT ERRED BY SUMMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICITON RELIEF   
 
A. Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal  
 
 An application for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19-4901 is civil in 
nature and is an entirely new proceeding distinct from the criminal action which led to 
the conviction.  Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App. 1994).   In order to prevail in a 
post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Id.     
 Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under 
I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable inferences made in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759 (Ct.App. 1991).   
Allegations contained in the verified petition are deemed true for the purpose of 
determining whether an evidentiary hearing should be held.  Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 
844 (Ct.App. 1994).    If the allegations do not frame a genuine issue of material fact, the 
court may grant a motion to summarily dismiss, but if the application raises material 
issues of fact, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id.      
 In determining whether a motion for summary disposition was properly granted, 
the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to petitioner and 
determines whether, if true, they would entitle petitioner to relief. Saykhamchone v. State, 
127 Idaho 319 (1995). 




The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is well 
established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  The 
"benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct 
so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be 
relied on as having produced a just result."  Id. at 686. 
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in order to be 
entitled to relief.  The defendant must demonstrate both that his counsel's performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been 
different.  Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 
Idaho 631 (1986). 
More specifically as to allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel based on 
tactical decisions, the Court of Appeals explained in Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396 (Ct. 
App. 2013): 
This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical  or strategic 
decisions of counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those 
decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, 
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. There is a strong 
presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide range of 
professional assistance.  
 
Id., p. 385-386 (internal citations omitted). 
 
C. Cumulative Error 
“Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.” Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 
696, 705 (Ct. App. 2015).   
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D. The Claims and the Court’s Rulings 
 The court issued a lengthy Order Granting State’s Motion for Summary 
Disposition and Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (hereinafter Order) which 
grouped Petitioner’s claims into six broad claims for post-conviction relief with sub-
issues within each claim.  Most of the claims alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, 
but there was also a Brady claim as well as prosecutorial misconduct.   
 Given the number of claims and length of the materials and rulings, Appellant 
will focus on the most important claims.   However, Appellant is expressly appealing the 
dismissal of the entire petition and all claims.  
E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding Joinder  
i) District court’s ruling 
The post-conviction  court summarized this claim as follows: 
Petitioner contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to oppose the 
State’s Motion for Joinder, or for failing to move to sever the cases. 
Petitioner contends such opposition or motion would have been 
successful, because joinder with Paris Davis’s case violated the rule set 
forth in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1970). Petitioner also 
contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay 
statements made by co-defendant at trial. Petitioner also contends his 
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue as a 
fundamental error on appeal. (footnote omitted) 
 
    . . . 
 
At Petitioner’s trial, both Jeremy Steinmetz and Frankie Hughes testified 
that Davis told Petitioner that he was going to prison. Hughes also testified 
that Davis told Petitioner and Hughes that they needed to burn their 
clothes. Hughes testified that this statement was obviously due to the fact 
that they had blood on their clothes. Petitioner contends that these 
statements (i.e. “Vance, you’re going to prison” and that they need to get 
rid of the clothing) would not have been admissible had Petitioner been 
tried separate from Davis. 
 
 Order, p. 7-8. (R. p.  356-357.) 
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  The Order explained that Jeremy Steinmetz testified that after the fight started, he 
ran out of the motel room and to his car and saw Paris Davis there, and she was freaking 
out and told him to get in the car. After the fight, which was at least a few minutes later, 
when he was driving them to Paris’ house she was still freaking out and told them they 
had to get rid of their clothing because it was evidence and she was speaking kind of loud 
and also said “Vance, you’re going to prison.”  (R. p. 357-358.)  
  The Order went on to state that Frankie Hughes’ testimony aligned with 
Steimetz’, that in the car Paris Davis was animated and crying and told Vance he was 
going to prison and she told them they needed to burn their clothes. (R. p. 358.)    
  The post-conviction court held that joinder was proper because Paris Davis’ 
statements would have been admissible against Vance in a separate trial as excited 
utterances. (R. p. 358, 360-361.)  According to the Order, the beating that took place was 
an event sufficiently startling to render inoperative the normal reflective thought process 
of an observer, Davis had a stressed and animated demeanor and her statements were 
made not long after the altercation. (R. p. 360.)  The Order concluded that she was clearly 
stressed and agitated by the situation and made the statements in the heat of the moment, 
so the statements were accordingly admissible as excited utterances.  (R. p. 361.)  The 
Order continued: 
The Court also finds the statement regarding burning the clothes qualifies 
as a statement against interest, but only as to Hughes.9 
 
 FN 9 
Hughes’ testimony regarding Davis’s statement that they 
needed to burn their clothes clearly inculpates Hughes; 
however, the statement that Petitioner is going to prison does 
not clearly inculpate Hughes or Steinmetz. 
 




The post-conviction court then considered whether the statements violated the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by determining whether they were 
inadmissible against Petitioner as a “testimonial statement” under Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004) and its progeny including Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). The Order ultimately determined they were 
nontestimonial statements and so Bruton did not apply.  (R. p. 365.) 
  The Order went on to hold that the initial joinder of the cases was proper given 
the allegations that Vance committed the aggravated battery and Paris Davis denied 
knowledge of it and solicited the destruction of evidence of it.  (R. p. 366.)     
The next issue is whether the cases should have been severed because the 
joinder was prejudicial to Petitioner. Petitioner’s sole contention is that 
Davis’s statements unfairly prejudiced him at trial. 
 
The Court concludes that Petitioner was not prejudiced by a joint trial. The 
statements at issue would have been admissible in a separate trial against 
Petitioner. Thus, it does not matter whether the trials were joint or 
separate. Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s first claim for relief 
fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact and must be dismissed. 
Petitioner’s attorneys were not ineffective for failing to oppose joinder of 
the cases or for moving for severance. Bond was not ineffective for 
objecting to the hearsay statements and appellate counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. Therefore, the State’s 
Motion for Summary Disposition is GRANTED on this claim. 
 
Order, p. 18 (emphasis added). (R. p. 367.) 
 
ii)  The district court erred in dismissing the joinder claim 
 
First of all, the witnesses testified that Paris Davis was not excited so the district 
court is simply incorrect in its ruling that the hearsay statements were admissible as 
excited utterances.  Conspicuously absent from the Order is the express evidence from 




 Jeremy Steinmetz testified as follows: 
Q. How do you know the individuals in the backseat heard Paris’ 
statement? 
 
A. She was speaking kind of loud. 
Q. Okay. She excited? 
A. Not excited. Freaked out about it. 
Q. Okay. Freaked out about it? 
A. Yeah. 
Tr. p. 740, lns. 21-25 p. 741, lns. 102 (emphasis added).  
Likewise Frankie Hughes testified as follows about when Paris was  in the 
car: 
Q. Did she appear excited? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Did she appear animated? 
A. What’s that? 
Q. Was she speaking loudly? 
A. Yes. 
Tr. p. 899, lns. 8-13 (emphasis added). 
 Since the declarant was not excited, it should go without saying that the excited 
utterance exception to the hearsay rule cannot apply.10  
                                            
10 Since no objection was made below (which is the very problem), no inquiry was made 
into the distinctions between being excited, being animated, and freaking out. Nor were 
the other components of the hearsay exception addressed, such as just when in the 20 




Even if the absence of the titular prerequisite for the excited utterance exception is 
ignored, its basis cannot be. Said exception is based on the premise that an event is so 
startling as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought process and so the witness 
must be speaking the truth.   
That is not what was happening here.  One can be freaking out or animated and 
nevertheless be using a reflective thought process. Paris was trying to control the 
situation and was ordering the others around from the beginning to the end of the car trip.  
She ordered them to get in the car, for Jeremy to go,  for them to get rid of their clothes, 
and  for  Jeremy to go home after they got to her house. (Tr. p. 737, 739-740, 756.)  There 
is nothing about this that mandates that a person must be speaking the truth, rather, the 
person is simply trying to get people to do what she wants.  In addition to ordering people 
around, Paris also physically took matters into her own hands. When Jeremy’s phone 
rang with a call from Kaylan Speers (another witness at the party) Paris took the phone 
away from him and would not let him answer it. (Tr. p. 756.)  In short, regardless of her 
demeanor, Paris was acting logically and calculatingly, not reflexively and thus 
truthfully.  
Next, the court strangely holds that Frankie Hughes’ testimony regarding  Paris’ 
statement about burning the clothes is somehow admissible as a statement against interest 
because it inculpates him.  The Order states: 
In order to qualify as a statement against interest, the statement, at the time 
of its making, must be so far contrary to the declarant’s interest, that a 
reasonable man in the declarant’s position would not have made the 
statement unless the declarant believed it to be true. I.R.E. 804(b)(3). 
 
. . .   The Court also finds the statement regarding burning the clothes 





 FN 9 
Hughes’ testimony regarding Davis’s statement that they 
needed to burn their clothes clearly inculpates Hughes; 
however, the statement that Petitioner is going to prison does 
not clearly inculpate Hughes or Steinmetz. 
 
Order, p. 11. (R. p. 360.) 
  This makes no sense. While the statement does inculpate Frankie Hughes, he is 
not the declarant of the statement (even if he is testifying about it) so the court clearly 
errs in holding it admissible as a statement against his interest. 
  To summarize, the statements of Paris Davis, to wit, “Vance, you are going to 
prison” and “you need to get rid of/burn those clothes” are not admissible for the reasons 
held by the court, to wit, as excited utterances or statements against interest.  The 
statements would not have been admissible in Vance’s separate trial.  Thus, his case 
should not have been joined with that of Paris Davis or, if joined, it should have been 
severed, or if not severed, the inadmissible hearsay statements should have been objected 
to.  The failure to do any of this was ineffective assistance of counsel, and the Order 
should be reversed and remanded on the joinder issue on this basis alone.   
  The Order’s next conclusion, to wit, that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial 
statements, is not even reached.  That is because it begins with the faulty premise that 
Paris Davis’ statements were admissible as excited utterances or statements against 
interest. Since they were not, the Order’s  analysis of the interplay of Crawford and 
Bruton is  beside the point. 
  Next as to the joinder/severance issue, the post-conviction court could not have 
been more wrong when it held that “Petitioner’s sole contention is that Davis’s 
statements unfairly prejudiced him at trial.” (R. p. 367.)  The amended petition contained 
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several pages devoted to the non-statement related prejudice of the joint trial, and it was 
discussed in Petitioner’s Response as well. (R. p. 155-157, 229.)  
  For example, evidence was introduced at trial regarding the high-risk felony 
traffic stop three days after the fight in which Vance was arrested.  The evidence included 
Detective Holland’s estimate that there were at least six undercover police vehicles as 
well as another five or six patrol vehicles involved, and officers had their weapons 
deployed. (Tr. p. 960-963.)   The evidence of the traffic stop was admitted solely for the 
purpose of establishing Paris Davis' knowledge of the battery.   In short, after Vance was 
arrested Detective Holland spoke to Paris Davis about the incident at the motel and she 
said she didn't know what he was talking about.  (Tr. p. 964-966.)  This was the basis of 
her accessory to aggravated battery charge.  
Obviously, it was prejudicial to Vance for the jury to learn about the lengths to 
which the police went for his arrest and the level of threat and dangerousness from him 
they perceived.  However, if he was not being tried with Paris Davis, evidence of the 
felony stop and arrest of Vance would not be otherwise relevant, because nothing about 
that stop or arrest would make any fact of consequence any more or less probable.  It was 
not an arrest contemporaneous with the offense nor did he make any admissions. To the 
contrary, he actually invoked his right to silence during his arrest which was then 
disclosed to the jury by Officer Holland:  “He invoked his rights a couple times stating I 
got rights.” (Tr.  p. 1020, lns. 19-20.) 
 While the Court of Appeals in the direct appeal refers to this as an unsolicited 
blurt and held it did not constitute fundamental error (there was no objection), the only 
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reason this was an issue at all was because the traffic stop and arrest came in as evidence 
against Paris Davis.  None of this would have happened had Vance been tried alone.  
Further prejudice resulted from the antagonistic defenses in the joint trial, because 
defense counsel for Paris Davis conceded during closing argument that she was guilty 
(albeit of misdemeanors) and specifically requested the jury to convict her of  
misdemeanor solicitation of destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence, and 
misdemeanor accessory to (aggravated) battery. (Tr. p. 1127, 1147, 1150.)  
Additionally, Vance was prejudiced by Paris Davis' jury instructions regarding 
her charges because the instructions assume the truth of the charges against Vance.  For 
example, one of the elements provide as follows: 
The defendant PARIS MARIE DAVIS did solicit and/or encourage Vance 
Thumm and/or others to engage in conduct which could constitute the 
crime of Destruction and/or Concealment of Evidence, to wit-: by 
encouraging and/or soliciting those involved in an Aggravated Battery to 
destroy the clothing that they wore at the time of the incident; . . .   
 
 Even if her crime should be considered separately, such an instruction unfairly 
instructs the jury that Vance is in fact guilty of the aggravated battery.  Petitioner was 
relatedly prejudiced because he had to split his preemptory challenges with Paris Davis 
(which he obviously would not have to do if tried alone). Since the two co-defendants 
were charged with different kinds of crimes, they were looking for different kinds of 
jurors.   
 Finally as to this issue, the district court acknowledged the claim of  ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise the joinder/severance issue as 
fundamental error on direct appeal, but simply referred this to the ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel section of the Order.  (R. p. 356.)   However, the Order did not 
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address  the alternatively pled claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to 
raise the Bruton issue as preserved error because Paris Davis’ counsel actually made the 
Bruton objection which the district court denied because there was not a confession 
involved.  (Tr. p. 744.)  Appellant asserts that while this was the  right result because the  
objection was not Paris Davis’ to make, it showed the district court would have overruled 
the Bruton objection had Vance’s attorney made it, so it could be considered to have been 
preserved error. 
F. Brady Violation-fingerprint report  
i) The court’s description of the claim and ruling 
The prosecution made a late disclosure of an exculpatory fingerprint report which 
defense counsel kept out of evidence without knowing what was in it.  The claims in the 
Amended Petition included a Brady claim, an allegation of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument.  The Order’s discussion of 
them is as follows in full: 
Petitioner’s fifth claim for post-conviction relief is a due process violation 
under Brady v. Maryland, based on the State’s failure to timely disclose a 
fingerprint report. Petitioner also alleges ineffective assistance of counsel 
and appellate counsel for failure to raise this issue. Petitioner also alleges 
prosecutorial misconduct on this basis. 
 
The State contends this claim fails, because the fingerprint report was 
disclosed (albeit untimely) prior to trial. The State contends that it was a 
tactical decision to not present the fingerprint evidence, because the State 
could have easily countered the evidence with presentation of testimony of 
the likelihood that fingerprints would not appear on an item. The State 
contends the presentation of such evidence would not have changed the 
outcome of the trial given the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, 





The fingerprint report showed that Petitioner’s fingerprints showed up 
only on a bottle of tequila and not on the beer and liquor bottles that were 
actually used as weapons during the fight. 
 
The United States Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 
87, 83 S.Ct. 1194,  1196–97 (1963), that the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Subsequent 
to Brady, the Supreme Court expanded the duty to include volunteering 
exculpatory evidence never requested, or requested only in a general way. 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383–84 
(1985). To prove a Brady violation, three components must be shown: 
“The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it 
is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been 
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice 
must have ensued.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 380, 247 P.3d 
582, 607 (2010). 
 
Here, Petitioner cannot meet the requirements to prove a Brady violation. 
First, the fingerprint report was produced prior to trial. Thus, there is no 
evidence the State suppressed such evidence. Second, Petitioner has failed 
to show how production of the report would have changed the outcome of 
the trial. There is no genuine issue of material fact that Bond was not 
deficient in this regard, because the decision to introduce such evidence 
was a tactical call. As the State points out, such evidence could have been 
easily countered by the State and such evidence was not relevant in light 
of the overwhelming testimony from Hughes regarding Petitioner beating 
Deven Ohls (nor was Petitioner charged with using any bottles in the 
aggravated battery of Ohls). On appeal, there is no evidence that Petitioner 
was prejudiced in this regard, because there is no reasonable probability 
that Petitioner would have prevailed on this claim. Finally, there is no 
evidence the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by the late 
disclosure. 
 
Accordingly, the Court finds this claim fails to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact and must be dismissed. 
 
Order, p. 38-40  (emphasis added). (R. p. 387-389.) 
ii) The court erred in its ruling 
  This is a perfect example of the post-conviction court just ignoring the actual 
claim as well as the argument and evidence.  To explain what actually happened, during 
trial but outside the presence of the jury, retained counsel objected to the late disclosure 
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of a fingerprint report.  (Tr. p. 750.)   The district court ruled: 
THE COURT: Okay, well, let me tell you, I don't want to mousetrap 
anybody. The State cannot present that evidence. It was not produced in a 
timely manner. There is no way the Defense can get another expert to look 
at it to refute if there is any refutation. It can't come in. 
 
I am going to advise the Defense, if you get up there and make a statement 
to that jury that there was absolutely no fingerprint evidence presented in 
this case, they didn't check for fingerprints, I will stop the closing 
argument right then, and I will allow the State to respond  and call its 
expert.  
 
Tr. p. 751, lns. 1-13. 
 
 First, the report was both exculpatory and material because it showed Mr. 
Thumm's fingerprint only on a bottle of Jose Cuervo tequila that was never alleged to 
have been a weapon, but excluded him from being the source of the fingerprints on the 
beer and malt liquor bottles that were actually used as weapons.  This evidence supports 
Mr. Thumm’s defense two ways.  First, it shows there is no physical evidence tying 
Vance to the attack. Second, it impeached the state’s primary witness (Frankie Hughes) 
who testified that Vance used the beer and malt liquor bottles as weapons.   
  Second, the post-conviction court goes too far when it  apparently draws a bright 
line for Brady violations and holds the suppression requirement cannot be met if the 
evidence is disclosed prior to trial even if late.  This is incorrect because while there is a 
different test for prejudice, many courts, both state and federal, consider that delayed 
disclosure can be a Brady violation.  Appellant is unware of any Idaho cases on point, 
and while different courts explain it in different ways, the First Circuit in the often cited 
case of United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408 (1st Cir. 1986), put it in a way that is 
instructive here and Appellant suggests should be adopted: 
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Where, as here, defendant has made a specific pretrial request for 
exculpatory information, reversal is required if nondisclosure "might have 
affected the outcome of the trial." When the issue is one of delayed 
disclosure rather than of nondisclosure, however, the test is whether 
defendant's counsel was prevented by the delay from using the disclosed 
material effectively in preparing and presenting the defendant's case. 
 
Id. p. 411-412 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). 
 
 That is exactly what happened in our case.  The report was disclosed too late for 
the defense attorney to determine its exculpatory nature in order to use it at trial, so it was 
not used.   Had it been used, it would have been very effective. 
 Again, the report would have provided Vance with a form of strong evidence, to 
wit, scientific evidence which does not put in his hands the bottles used as weapons in the 
fight.  Not incidentally, while the state said that it could have easily countered this 
evidence, it provided no proof of this.  
As to the value of the absence of fingerprint evidence, interestingly, the Ninth 
Circuit has reversed a conviction where the district court did not allow the defendant to 
argue the lack of fingerprint evidence to the jury. In United States v. Thompson, 37 F.3d 
450 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit explained: 
Because evidence comes in various forms, some stronger and some 
weaker, a defendant is entitled to argue to the jury that the government's 
failure to present a particular type of strong evidence against her - e.g., 
fingerprints - weakens its case.  
 
Id. p. 454. 
 Secondly, the fingerprint report would have been extremely effective in 
impeaching the state’s primary witness Frankie Hughes.   Hughes testified that Vance 
used both the beer and malt liquor bottles as weapons, neither of which had Vance’s 
fingerprints on them.  It does not matter that Vance was not charged with using the 
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bottles as weapons, the scientific evidence does not support the claims of the state’s 
witness who, which will be discussed below, had great incentive to place blame on 
Vance. 
While on the topic of Frankie Hughes, the Order uses circular logic to conclude 
that the fingerprint evidence would be countered by the overwhelming eyewitness 
evidence of Frankie Hughes.  But it was the eyewitness evidence of Frankie Hughes that 
was impeached with the fingerprint evidence.11  
 The Order is also wrong about the failure to use the report being a tactical 
decision. While it was ignored, there is definitive proof that it was not.   Vance filed a bar 
complaint against retained counsel Virginia Bond to which she filed a response. That 
response shows she did not understand, even after trial, what the results really were. She 
thought Vance’s fingerprints were on a 44-oz. beer bottle (the malt liquor bottle) that had 
been used as a weapon and was proud of herself for successfully getting them suppressed: 
The prosecutor threw some very important evidence out late, even in trial.  
Video/Audio of yet another aggravated battery they had never disclosed, 
and evidence of Vance Thumm’s fingerprint on a 44oz beer bottle that had 
been used as a weapon. I managed to keep all the evidence out. 
 
Response, p. 7. (R. p. 252.) 
 
Of course, Vance’s fingerprints were not found on any 44-oz. bottle and were 
only found on one bottle that had not been used as a weapon.     
                                            
11 As an aside, throughout the Order the fallback position of the post-conviction court is 
that the claimed errors of trial counsel did not matter because of the eye witness 
testimony of co-defendant Frankie Hughes. But many of trial counsel’s errors were 
failures to impeach Frankie Hughes or evidence that corroborated Frankie Hughes.  Thus, 
anything that shows he lies, is wrong, is biased, or takes away his corroboration, is very 
important impeachment in and of itself and also has a cumulative effect.  
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Alternatively, Petitioner asserts that even though the disclosure of the fingerprint 
evidence was late, retained counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize the 
exculpatory nature of the report.   Retained counsel successfully excluded the fingerprint 
report without having seen it and/or considering it.  Keeping the fingerprint evidence out 
without knowing if it was good or bad for Vance was ineffective assistance of counsel.   
 The exculpatory nature of the report is apparent from the face, and it does not 
require expert testimony to ascertain that the report is good for Vance.  The report did not 
hurt Vance in any way. Thus, retained counsel was ineffective for failing to use the 
exculpatory fingerprint report at trial to defend Vance, or alternatively, by failing to 
obtain a continuance to give her time to be able to use the report to its best effect.    
To summarize, the district court erred because late disclosure can be a Brady 
violation, counsel’s suppression of exculpatory evidence was not a tactical decision, and 
Vance suffered prejudice because he was deprived of a scientific defense and powerful 
impeachment of the main witness against him. 
Further regarding the fingerprints, the prosecutor violated Mr. Thumm’s due 
process right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
argument.  The prosecutor described the relevant scene as follows: 
Vance is getting tired. Hey, give me that bottle. He needs something else 
to finish the job. He is getting tired. He needs something else.  Give me 
that bottle. Hits him in the head a couple times, the forty ounce bottle. 
Then a beer bottle.  
 
Tr. p. 1089, lns. 8-12. 
However, during that argument, the prosecutor knew that he was alone in 
knowing that the physical evidence did not support his theory, to wit, Vance’s 
fingerprints had not been found on any bottle that he was claiming Vance used as a 
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weapon.  In other words, the state took advantage of its own delay in disclosing by 
making an argument which would have been severely weakened had it timely disclosed 
the report.  Further, the prosecutor knew that he was safe from any sort of responsive 
argument from defense counsel about the fingerprints given the court’s warnings about 
her closing argument.12  
G.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Trial 
  i)  Court’s descriptions of the claims and rulings 
 
Petitioner’s third claim for post-conviction relief is that Bond provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel by (a) failing to oppose the trial court’s 
ruling that evidence of gang membership could be used to impeach on the 
issue of credibility and to show a common scheme or plan, (b) failing to 
call as witnesses Ariel Carpenter, Chris Smith, Heather Barr, Petitioner, 
and Dr. Wasielewski, (c) failing to object to and impeach Jeremy 
Steinmetz’s testimony, (d) failing to object to Paris Davis’s use of the 
word “prison” as a legal conclusion, (e) failing to impeach Frankie Hughes 
with evidence of bias, and (f) failing to impeach/refresh Detectives or 
follow up. Each claim will be addressed in turn. 
 
Order, p. 27. (R. p. 376.) 
 
 ii) Failure to renew an objection to and impeach Jeremy Steinmetz’ testimony  
 
On the first day of trial, the prosecution brought up an I.R.E. 404(b) notice stating 
that four days after the fight, Vance Thumm and Paris Davis arrived at Jeremy Steinmetz'  
house and Vance told him "don't say nothing."  (Tr. p. 36-37.)  Retained counsel objected 
to admission of the statement, inter alia, because it was too prejudicial. (Tr. p. 38.)  The 
trial court ruled: 
Well, once again, I am not going to rule on this until I hear the 
circumstances and all the background of the conversation. At first blush, it 
                                            
12 This instance of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument could not be raised on 
direct appeal because the fingerprint report was not part of the record.  
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would appear to be overly prejudicial. But I can't do a balancing test 
unless I know all the facts.  
 
Tr. p. 38, ln. 25--p. 39, ln. 5 (emphasis added).  
 Later at trial, outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor advised the court that 
they are getting close to that testimony (Tr. p. 748-749.)  The court stated the evidence 
was clearly relevant to the defendant's consciousness of guilt and invited objection, to 
which there was none, and the statement came in later.  (Tr. p. 749,  763.) 
 Next, Jeremy Steinmetz testified that the police showed him a line-up from which 
he did not (but supposedly could have) identify Vance Thumm because he was scared of 
him. (Tr. p. 764-765.)  However, Jeremy had testified differently at Vance Thumm's 
preliminary hearing, testifying there that he didn't identify Vance the first time because 
he was "just trying to protect [Vance]."   (Tr. 5/21/2009, p. 21, ln. 13.)  He then testified 
that he changed his story with the police after Vance had come to his house "[o]nly after 
the police had told me his name. They knew him." (Tr. 5/9/2009, p. 23, lns. 9-10.)   He 
then said that Vance did not threaten him. (Tr. 5/9/2009, p. 23).   
 Later at the preliminary hearing, in regard to the charge of intimidation of a 
witness (dismissed), the magistrate court carefully questioned Jeremy Steinmetz 
regarding his statement not to say anything:   
THE COURT: Did you feel intimidated by Mr. Thumm? 
 
THE WITNESS: No.  
 
THE COURT: Did you feel threatened by him?  
 
THE WITNESS: No.  
 
THE COURT: Did you feel he was harassing you in any way? 
 




THE COURT: Well, explain to the Court again what exactly was 
said. 
 
THE WITNESS: Just, hey, man, don't say nothing. 
 
THE COURT: That's it? 
 
THE WITNESS: Basically causal-like manner. 
 
THE COURT: You never felt threatened, intimidated or harassed 
in any way? 
 
THE WITNESS: No. 
 
Tr. Prelim. 5/21/2009, p. 36, lns. 5-21. 
 At trial, retained counsel incredibly did not impeach his trial testimony that he did 
not initially identify Vance because of fear with his testimony at the preliminary hearing 
which indicated that it was not because he was scared of him, but rather it was to protect 
him.  Nor did retained counsel use the detailed exchange between the magistrate and the 
witness which further confirmed that Jeremy was not scared of Vance.  This failure then 
allowed the prosecutor to argue in closing that Jeremy is afraid of Vance. (Tr. p. 1178.) 
 The post-conviction court held that the decision to not object to the “don’t say 
nothing” testimony was not deficient and concluded it was admissible. (R. p. 382.)   This 
ignores that the trial court had initially thought it unduly prejudicial and finally ruled 
without doing a balancing test and nothing had happened in trial up to that point which 
made it any less prejudicial. In short, it is objectively unreasonable to not renew the 
unduly prejudicial objection and to instead allow the court to rule without a balancing test 
where the court initially indicates it is inadmissible and nothing has changed.   
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 As to the failure to impeach Steinmetz with his preliminary hearing testimony 
establishing that he was not afraid of Vance, the post-conviction court found that it was a 
strategic call and:  
Had Bond impeached Steinmetz on his preliminary hearing statements, it 
is very likely that Steinmetz would have testified that he was so afraid of 
Petitioner he made the opposite statements at his preliminary hearing. It 
was a strategic decision to not dig the hole any further in this regard.  
 
Order, p. 33. (R. p. 382.) 
  
 This is pure conjecture on the part of the court.  Regardless of how Steinmetz 
answered he was established as a perjurer, with the only question being how big of one.    
iii) Failure to impeach Frankie Hughes 
 
 Mr. Thumm alleged that  retained counsel was ineffective because she failed to 
impeach Frankie Hughes with the long exposure to prison he was facing and thus his 
great motivation to provide biased testimony against Vance.  At the time he was 
testifying,  he was currently charged with crimes with a maximum of 30 years in prison. 
At trial he admitted to hitting Brooke Eberhardt over the head with a beer bottle which 
could have given rise to him being charged and facing up to 30 more years for a total of 
60 years. (R. p. 191.) 
 The post-conviction court’s ruling was that the failure to impeach allegation was 
clearly disproved by the record because the “state elicited testimony on direct 
examination regarding Hughes’ charges and the exposure he faced.” (R. p. 383.)  Also, 
co-counsel had questioned him about the police indicating to him that if he cooperated 
and they put in a good word for him he could maybe get probation. (R. p. 384.)  
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 The Order does not provide citations, but at the place in the trial transcript where 
the state elicits testimony from Hughes about his aggravated battery charges, there is 
absolutely no mention of what sort of a sentence those charges can entail.   (Tr. p. 908.) 
 Nor does the Order explain why co-counsel’s discussion regarding probation 
would alert the jury as to the potential of 30 or up to 60 years that Frankie Hughes was 
facing, and thus his real motivation to lie. 
 iv) Failure to renew objection to Paris Davis’ use of  “prison” 
While it may seem a small thing, this is again a situation where retained counsel 
preliminarily objected to something so it is known she understood the evidence and the 
problem with it, but then failed to renew the objection at the right time.   
Here, well prior to the testimony about Paris Davis saying “Vance you are going 
to prison,” retained counsel objected to it as an improper legal conclusion.  (Tr. p. 31-33.) 
The prosecutor responded that the jury just considers jail and prison to be one and the 
same and that the state was not eliciting a legal conclusion.  (Tr. p. 35.)  Then, the 
prosecutor did just that, establishing through Detective Holland that one cannot go to 
prison for a misdemeanor, but that Paris told Vance he was going to prison to show he 
had committed a felony.   Retained counsel failed to renew her objection.  
The post-conviction court held that whether to object or not is a tactical decision, 
there is no evidence that an objection would have been sustained, and, as previously 
discussed, Paris’ statement is admissible as an excited utterance. (R. p. 383.) 
Of course, the district court misses the point, which is that retained counsel failed 
to call the prosecutor out when he did the exact thing he claimed he was not going to do, 
to wit, use Paris’ choice of the word “prison” as a legal conclusion.  
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v) Counsel failed to oppose the proposed impeachment of witnesses by gang 
membership (Abel issue)  
Retained counsel just conceded a ruling that had been made in Paris’ case and 
then simply applied to Vance’s, to wit, that pursuant to United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 
445 (1984), evidence of gang membership would be admissible to impeach on the issue 
of credibility and the possibility that it could show common scheme, plan or identity 
depending on how the evidence developed. (Tr. p. 12-13.)     
Petitioner made several claims regarding this issue.  First, Abel was decided only 
by reference to the rules of evidence.  Thus, trial counsel was ineffective for not 
challenging the impeachment evidence ruling as a violation of Mr. Thumm’s Fifth, Sixth,  
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to testify and present a complete defense.13    
 Second, retained counsel did not oppose the expansion of the original Abel ruling 
beyond Vance Thumm, Paris Davis, and Heather Barr to include Chris Smith (the 
admitted stabber of Deven Ohls) nor Ariel Carpenter, another person at the party.   
 Ariel Carpenter was never shown to be a close associate of the gang and therefore 
could be impeached if she were to testify, the state never mentioned her or claimed to 
have information regarding her.  In other words, retained counsel never obtained a ruling 
                                            
13 The relevant caselaw includes Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), where  the United 
States Supreme Court explained that the right to testify on one’s own behalf  stems from 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory 
Process Clause, and the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self incrimination.  The 
Sixth Amendment also guarantees a criminal defendant the right to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).  The Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination. See e.g., Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985).  The 
right to present a complete and meaningful defense is grounded in the Sixth 
Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
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as to Ariel Carpenter, she was just never mentioned again.  She certainly did not testify, 
and the state did not have to even claim anything about her, much less prove it.  
 Ariel Carpenter was interviewed by Detective Leavitt and told him that Deven 
Ohls was talking with Frankie Hughes and a fight broke out between them for no 
apparent reason and another male jumped in. She continued by stating that when the fight 
broke out, she, Vance and Paris all ran from the room.  (R. p. 259, Police report of 
Detective Leavitt dated 7/24/2009, p. 1.) 
 The second problem is that while retained counsel inquired as to what the trial 
court's ruling would be as to Chris Smith since he was not a member of the same gang, 
she did not in any way argue that Abel should not apply because Abel was based on the 
witness and parties “common membership in an organization.”  Retained counsel should 
have argued that other courts which have addressed this issue have reached a similar 
conclusion based upon facts similar to those present in the instant case.14    
                                            
14  For example, in United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1990), the Tenth 
Circuit followed Abel in observing that in specific contexts, evidence of gang 
membership may be admissible.  Id., 899 F.2d at 986-987.  However, it is essential that 
the State must establish “that the defendant and the witness to be impeached belong to the 
same gang.”  Id. at 986.  See also United States v. Elkins, 70 F.3d 81 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that evidence that the parties were members of some gang is an insufficient basis 
for admission because the prosecutor is required to show more than “membership in any 
gang but rather the same gang.”) (emphasis added).  United States v. Takasashi, 205 F.3d 
1161 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that in order to admit evidence of gang membership for 
bias, both the defendant and witness must be members of the same gang); and State v. 
Brown, 739 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2007) (recognizing that common gang membership may 
be sufficiently probative to show bias if the attributes of the gang have a direct bearing on 
the fact of bias and “for gang membership to be admissible to show bias, the proponent of 
the evidence must establish a foundation showing common membership.”)  In United 
States v. Gonzalez, 155 Fed. Appx. 580 (3rd Cir. 2004), the Third Circuit reached the 
same conclusion in an unpublished opinion.  In Gonzalez, the prosecutor even 




 Petitioner acknowledges that the Idaho Court of Appeals disagreed and upheld the 
trial court's ruling that "the evidence may be admissible even if the witness and defendant 
are members of different gangs, provided that the evidence is relevant and the probative 
value is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.”   Thumm, 153 Idaho 
at 541-542.     However, had some argument been made in the trial court and the 
persuasive caselaw above provided, there is a reasonable probability that the ruling would  
have gone the other way.15  
 Christopher Smith had told police they had the wrong suspect (Vance) arrested. 
(R. p. 262, Holland report 4/17/2009, p. 1.)  Smith also told police that he had started the 
fight after Deven Ohls said something he didn’t like and punched him. (Id.)  Smith said 
the fight continued and ultimately he “put steel in him.” (Id., p. 1-2.) 
The post-conviction court ruled as followed: 
 
The Court finds that this claim must be dismissed for several reasons. 
First, the Court of Appeals has already determined that the Trial Court 
properly determined that the State could impeach witnesses who were in a 
gang with evidence of their gang membership to attack their credibility. 
Second, Petitioner has failed to provide affidavits showing that any of 
these witnesses would have in fact testified in accordance with the 
exculpatory statements made in the police reports. See Wolf v. State, 152 
Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011) (“A claim for post-
conviction relief will be subject to summary dismissal the applicant has 
not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential 
element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of 
proof.”). Finally, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to create a 
                                            
15 As a related claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that will be simply 
noted here, in his Opening brief in the direct appeal, appellate counsel cited only to Abel 
and Keys, supra.  Appellate counsel failed to cite to the other existing relevant and 
persuasive authority above regarding the limitations on the Abel ruling in Appellant’s 
Opening brief or reply brief.  Instead, appellate counsel only cited to the additional cases 
in his brief in support of petition for review (not granted) after the issue had been lost in 




genuine issue of material fact that counsel was deficient for challenging 
the Trial Court’s ruling given the clear status of the law in this regard. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
that, at a minimum, the prejudice prong of Strickland was not violated. 
 
Order, p. 30. (R. p. 379.) 
 
Again, the post-conviction court misses the point.  First, the ruling does not 
address the complete and utter lack of showing that Carpenter was a gang member or 
associate. Second, in light of the many contrary cases cited, the law is not as clear as 
suggested.  Third, the ruling does not address the failure to raise the issue as one of 
constitutional proportions, rather than of mere evidentiary error.  Finally, for this stage of 
the case, the police reports of the witness statements provided by the state in discovery 
should suffice.   
 vi) Failing to impeach/refresh detectives or follow up 
The court characterized the claims as follows: 
 
Petitioner contends Bond was ineffective for failing to refresh Detectives 
Leavitt and Holland with a report regarding a photo lineup that was shown 
to Ohls and his girlfriend, Brooke Eberhardt, and for failing to impeach 
Detective Holland about lying to Hughes about fingerprints on a bottle. 
 
    . . . 
    
Petitioner fails to identify how Bond was deficient for failing to impeach 
the detectives or for failing to “follow up.”  Petitioner has provided no 
evidence that the outcome of the trial would have been different had 
counsel refreshed the detectives’ recollection or impeached Detective 
Holland. Accordingly, the Court finds that, at a minimum, there is no 
genuine issue of material fact implicating the prejudice prong of 
Strickland. 
 




The court gave these claims short shrift, as is shown by what actually happened. 
First, retained counsel questioned Detective Leavitt about his and Detective Holland’s 
meeting with Deven Ohls (victim) and his girlfriend Brooke Everhart at her apartment. 
(Tr. p. 308.) When asked whether Detective Holland showed Deven Ohls a lineup, 
Detective Leavitt said he couldn’t recall without refreshing his memory with the report. 
(Tr. p. 308-309.) Retained counsel did not refresh his memory with the report, but instead 
said: 
That’s kind of important, so I will retain you, you know, on your subpoena 
and let you come back, so we can talk about that later. 
 
Tr. p. 309, lns. 3-5. 
Detective Leavitt was not recalled and that lineup was never mentioned again. 
Retained counsel also failed to ask Holland about it when he testified later. However, the 
report by Detective Holland which stated he and Detective Leavitt met with the victim 
Deven Ohls and his girlfriend Brooke Eberhardt stated they both viewed lineups, 
including one that included Vance, and neither were able to identify a subject. (R. 206.) 
Second, retained counsel asked Detective Leavitt the following: 
Isn’t it true that in your interview with on 5/1 of 2009 you told Frankie 
Hughes that you had fingerprints and DNA on a bottle that would connect 
him with hitting Brooke Everhart? 
 
Tr. p. 334, lns. 12-15. 
Detective Leavitt testified that he did not recall making that statement, and the 
court sustained a hearsay objection as to whether he heard Detective Holland make it. 
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(Tr. p. 335.) Retained counsel did establish that said interview was audio recorded, but 
that was one of the late redacted tapes that could not be used.16 (Tr. p. 335.)  
Even though Detective Holland testified after Detective Leavitt, retained counsel 
failed to ask him the same question even though she had the police report from the 
interview in which Detective Holland described confronting Hughes with the evidence 
including his possible prints on a bottle used to strike Brooke Eberhardt. (R. p. 210.)  
Further, retained counsel failed to impeach Detective Holland about lying to 
Frankie Hughes when he confronted him about possible fingerprints on bottles since he 
obviously did not have the fingerprint results at that time since they only had just gotten 
the results shortly before trial.  
 As to the lineups, the inability of the victim and his girlfriend to identify Vance is  
more impeachment of Frankie Hughes’ story which retained counsel did not pursue. 
Likewise,  retained counsel is forgoing even more chances to show the jury that the 
state’s witnesses lie, even the police. 
H. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Based on Lack of Preparation 
 Appellant will provide the Order’s summary of all these claims, but discuss the 
ruling and Appellant’s response to only two of them.  The Order summarized the lack of 
preparation claims as follows: 
Petitioner’s second claim for post-conviction relief is that Wollen and 
Bond provided ineffective assistance of counsel by (a) failing to timely 
disclose an expert witness who could have provided exculpatory evidence, 
(b) missing the deadline to submit redacted tapes, (c) failing to timely file 
a motion to suppress the lineups, (d) failing to adequately meet, 
communicate, prepare, or provide discovery to Petitioner, and (e) failing 
                                            
16 As a claim of pre-trial ineffective assistance of counsel, retained counsel missed the 
deadline for submitting redacted tapes and so could not use them for impeachment.  
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to adequately prepare for Helen Fischer’s testimony. Each claim will be 
addressed in turn. 
 
Order, p. 18. (R. p. 367.) 
 
i) Failure to provide discovery to Vance 
The prosecutor and retained counsel entered into a protective order which did not 
allow discovery produced after a particular date to be physically transferred to Vance. 
However, his attorneys did not even give  him the previous discovery either.  
As to the failure to provide or to go over discovery with Vance, the post-
conviction court ruled that Petitioner failed to identify any specific discovery he was 
denied access to and how the outcome would be different. (R. p. 374-375.) 
Vance did identify specific discovery. The fingerprint report is a perfect example 
of Vance being prejudiced by not being given, or being able to be given, the discovery. 
The fingerprint results report was in the discovery subject to the protective order and was 
not seen by Vance.  Retained counsel did not look at the fingerprint report because it was 
tardy, she was moving her office, and trial was upon her. However, had Vance had it, he 
would have seen it was exculpatory because he is the one who later realized it was 
exculpatory after he saw it. Had he been timely given that discovery he could have 
alerted retained counsel to its exculpatory nature and it could have been used at trial 
instead of it mistakenly being excluded by retained counsel. 
ii) Failure to timely move to suppress lineups 
As to the claim regarding retained counsel’s failure to timely file a motion to 
suppress the lineups, the district court ruled that even if the motion was timely and was 
successful, Petitioner has not shown the outcome of the case would have been different 
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because the evidence of Frankie Hughes, who knew Vance, still implicated him in the 
crime. (R. p. 373.)    
The other IDs of Vance from the unduly suggestive lineups did matter. They 
unfairly corroborated Frankie Hughes who blamed it all on Vance.  Without them, the 
case was essentially just  Frankie Hughes’ word.   
I. Ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and on appeal 
The Order characterized these claims as follows: 
Petitioner’s fourth claim for post-conviction relief is that Anthony Geddes 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and appellate 
counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise the 
Bruton issue, Abel issue, Brady issue, and all the instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
 
Order, p. 385. (R. p. 385.) 
 
 The post-conviction court ruled that these issues (or alternative basis of issues) 
would not have been successful on appeal. (R. p. 387.)   Appellant has addressed the first 
three of these  in the relevant sections and will discuss the prosecutorial misconduct 
immediately below.  
J. Prosecutorial misconduct 
Petitioner’s sixth claim for post-conviction relief is that the prosecutor 
violated his due process right to a fair trial in multiple ways, but most 
significantly, by making improper closing arguments. Petitioner also 
alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object or raise this 
issue. 
 
Order, p. 40. (R. p. 389.)  
  
 The post-conviction court dismissed this claim:  
 
Petitioner has made no showing that the above issues were unknown and 
could not have reasonably been known during the direct appeal. Thus, the 
claims of prosecutorial misconduct are waived. Moreover, there is no 
showing that Petitioner would have been successful on appeal or that the 
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outcome of his trial would have been different had these issues been 
raised. Indeed, appellate counsel did raise three instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct. As set forth previously, appellate counsel may fail to raise an 
issue because he or she “foresees little or no likelihood of success on that 
issue; indeed, the weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as 
one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy.” Dunlap v. State, 
159 Idaho 280, 296, 360 P.3d 289, 305 (2015) (citations omitted). Here, 
there is not a reasonable probability that Petitioner would have prevailed. 
Petitioner has also failed to show how the alleged misconduct amounted to 
prejudice or reversible error. Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed. 
 
Order, p. 41-42. (R. p. 390-391.) 
 
Appellant asserts that had trial counsel objected and harmless error rather than 
fundamental error review applied and/or had appellate counsel added all of the following 
complaints about the state’s closing argument to the three actually argued, one of which 
was found to be improper albeit not fundamental error, then the results on appeal would 
have been different.  
First, while having the words "no defense" up on his power point presentation, the 
prosecutor disparaged defense counsel and the defense: 
You know, it's interesting when you don't have a defense, there's certain 
things that happen. Okay? There's certain techniques that are used. Let me 
go through some of these techniques. You create a smoke cloud. Ask an 
octopus if that works. Okay. You put the police on trial to deflect attention 
from your actions.   
 
 Remember in opening statements, Ms. Virginia Bond told you she was 
going to talk to you about the police actions in the case. Remember that? 
Well, that's moved a little bit. That's changed a little bit. But what happens 
is just as Ms. Virginia Bond says, hey, if Frankie is pointing the finger, 
there is a reason why he is pointing the finger; right?  If the Defense is 
putting the police on trial there's a reason why they are putting the police 
on trial. You pull a red herring, you cross the trail to divert to other issues 
that aren't even there. Other details that are not elements. And lastly, you 
present a moving target and you change. If you don't have a defense, that's 
pretty common.  
 




 Next, the prosecutor made unsupported comments about the victim, Deven Ohls, 
being afraid of Vance Thumm and because of that he committed perjury:  
“Why do you think in court he won’t identify the attacker?”  (Tr. p. 1176.) 
 
“Why do you think he doesn’t identify Vance.”  (Tr. p. 1176.)     
 
“Yeah, he won't ID. He won't ID him.  It's not disfigurement. Yeah, he is 
going to say that because that because takes care of Vance and Vance isn't 
going to be riding him anymore. See how that works?”  (Tr. p. 1179.) 
  
“And they [statements] tell you that Deven is minimizing because he is 
scared and it tells you that Vance is guilty of aggravated battery.” (Tr. p. 
1181.) 
 The prosecutor also improperly argued to the jury that Jeremy Steinmetz was 
afraid of Vance:  
“He is a 22-year-old timid young man because if you notice his testimony, 
he wouldn't even look at Vance. He coward [sic] from Vance because he 
knows what Vance can do.”   (Tr. p. 1178.) 
 
“Protecting Paris. Yeah, they're still friends. Scared of Vance.”   (Tr. p. 
1179.) 
 
 Of course, Jeremy’s only comment at trial about fear was in reference to him not 
identifying Vance to the police, and even that was at odds with his preliminary hearing 
testimony (with which retained counsel did not impeach him) indicating he was not 
scared of Vance.  
  Also, the prosecutor mischaracterized significant evidence, arguing that Frankie 
Hughes admitted to the attack rather than denying it and blaming it on Vance. (Tr. p. 
1179.) 
 And finally, the prosecutor used inflammatory words while arguing that Vance 
was part of the fight because once it began he would not have turned tail and ran:  
“No alpha male does that. And he won't let a kill go without tasting the 




Wherefore, for the reasons above stated, Appellant respectfully requests the 
district court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief be 
reversed and remanded to the district court.   
DATED this 30th day of January, 2018.      
       
/s/ Greg S. Silvey  
      Greg S. Silvey 
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